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A note from the editors
Krzysztof Uniłowski passed away earlier this December. For 
the last twenty years, he has been crucial to Polish literary 
studies. Writing on a broad range of topics – from reviews of 
contemporary Polish novels to essays on the idea of moderni-
ty, from class-oriented analyses of sci-fi books and TV shows 
to comments on the politics and ethics of literary criticism  
– he developed an impressive and highly unique critical per-
spective, or indeed: a unique language of criticism, one that 
has managed and will undoubtedly still manage to inspire 
countless critics of all generations. Throughout his work, 
Uniłowski drew heavily on historical materialism, constantly 
balancing his instinctive focus on the political – and, speci-
fically, on class – with his equally instinctive conviction as to 
the irreplaceability of literary form. While we might not have 
agreed on every single issue – as is always the case on the Left 
– we in “Praktyka Teoretyczna” are proud to have called him 
not just an inspiration, but a comrade. 
    Uniłowski passed away while putting finishing touches 
to the essay we’re presenting below. Unfortunately, he never 
managed to send us the finished abstract/summary for this 
article, so it falls to us to try and summarise its main theses. 
}
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The issues raised in this erudite and formally complex piece 
include such fundamental questions as: in what sense do the 
fictional worlds resemble the non-fictional one, and how do 
we inhabit them? What’s the relationship between immersion 
and interpretation? What real-life figures can help us imagine 
or visualise our intimate yet inherently social relationship 
with the fictional (are we guests, dwellers, passersby...)? Uni-
łowski looks for answers in contemporary Marxist criticism 
(Eagleton, Jameson, Berardi), sci-fi and fantasy writing (Lem, 
Sapkowski, Martin), as well as modern continental philoso-
phy (Gadamer, Heidegger) and – in the last part of the essay 
– contemporary game studies. 
    We’re happy to be able to present Uniłowski’s piece in two 
versions, the original Polish as well as its English translation 
(by Jakob Ziguras). In order to preserve the unmistakable 
flow of Uniłowski’s thought in English, small changes were 
introduced – with the author’s full approval – in the English 
version. We trust that our Polish-speaking readers will find 
the comparison of the two versions interesting and instruc-
tive, as they seem to give a unique insight into Uniłowski’s 
writing process.
Keywords: textualism, materialism, immersion, interpretation, utopia
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Around 2000, many attempts were made to revise the textual paradigm 
that had dominated the humanities since the 1970s. These efforts have 
had (and have) an important political profile. Referring to the great 
criticism of postmodernism carried out by, among others, Fredric Jame-
son (1991) or Terry Eagleton (Eagleton 1996), it was eagerly emphasi-
zed that postmodern textualism belongs to the rules of late capitalist, 
neoliberal economics.1 Hence, the attempts to recover all that was lost 
in the postmodern circulation of signs: the body (also the social body), 
sexuality, sensual experience, etc. The generational aspect also seems to 
be important here. New theoretical projects aroused particular interest 
among young scholars in the humanities, wishing to stand apart from 
the generation of their postmodern “fathers”.
I provide some reflections on such concepts as new materialism or 
immersion. Their popularity shows the ambition to go beyond the limits 
of textualism, but one can doubt whether all these efforts allow us to 
achieve the intended goal. Finally, the body, the social body, sexuality, 
sensual experience—all this is subject to interpretation, which leads us 
back to textuality.
I
The death of the author was supposed to serve the interpretative freedom 
of the reader. It placed him, however, against an impenetrable textual 
machinery, whose “sense-producing work” realised itself as if beyond 
every economy and teleology. The new understanding of the text con-
stituted—at least in intention—a form of negation of the capitalist 
system. It marked out a sphere of production not subject to the catego-
ries of profit or, more broadly, of exchange value. For this reason, one 
should value the emancipatory and utopian potential of this conception; 
yet, on the other hand, the text as a process in which “languages circu-
late” unceasingly (Barthes 1977:164), may, equally well, be treated as 
an automaton, constituting an aesthetic representation of capitalism 
and semiocapitalism.
 In relation to such a text, we find ourselves in a position simi-
lar to that of the protagonists of Stanisław Lem’s Eden, who, having 
penetrated a foreign planet, come across something that seems to be 
a massive factory. One of them describes it thus:
1 The book by Bartosz Kuźniarz (2011) should be mentioned here from the 
Polish humanities literature.
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The Doctor smiled. “These things are drawn in here” – he pointed to the snout, 
which just then happened to open. “Now it’s warming up inside, see? And now 
they’re melting, fusing, being carried to the top in portions, where they’re treated. 
Then, still red-hot, they drop to the bottom, underground – there must be 
another level there – and something else happens to them, and they come back 
up, by the same well, pale but still glowing. They journey up to the ceiling, fall 
into this” – he indicated the funnel – “and from there go into the trough, then 
the snout, melt, and so on and so on, forming, melting, forming” (Lem 1990: 
50).
The very description of the thing in question as a “factory” is offered 
— how could it be otherwise—by the Engineer (“Well, we’re home at 
last — this is a factory, an automated factory!” — Lem 1990: 46) and, 
in accordance with the principle of the Adamic name, is consistently 
exploited by the protagonists in their attempts to describe and cogniti-
vely master the object. Nevertheless, Lem’s third-person narrative also 
introduces a few other tropes, transforming the object into a space 
—relating it now to a forest (“they wandered through the pulsing forest 
of this unusual factory” – Lem 1990: 47), now to an underground 
labyrinth (“the labyrinth on tubes” – Lem 1990: 49)—and, above all, 
it makes use of descriptions that animate the “factory” and ascribe to it 
the characteristics of a massive monster, a leviathan, in the bowels of 
which the astronaut-researchers have found themselves. If the Engineer’s 
first identification domesticated this space (“we’re home”), now—in 
accordance with the progress of the protagonist’s journey—the space 
undergoes a de-realisation, being transformed, according to the logic of 
a nightmare, into a symbolic zone of danger and trial (a fairy-tale forest), 
metaphysical and existential riddle (a mythical labyrinth) and eschato-
logical passage (the biblical Leviathan). The oneiric character of this 
fragment of the story is underlined by the fluid border between third-
-person narration and the protagonists’ own speech; for instance, meta-
phorical descriptions pass from the text of the story into the independent 
speech of the characters. As an example, the “snout” appears first on the 
part of the narrator, and is next referred to with the pronoun “it” by the 
Doctor. We have, thus, an uncommon situation, where the narrator’s 
descriptions qualify the seemingly independent speech of the characters. 
At the same time, the discourse implied by the original identification 
and the first name (“factory”), loses credibility and is now used as a mere 
quotation, thus underlining its own conventional character.
The metaphoricity and oneiric lability of the space sets into motion 
a process of cognitive dispossession of the protagonists; while the unen-
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ding and impalpable circulation—the product  is transformed seamles-
sly into waste, and this in turn into raw material— appears to be marked 
by madness. Production directed at itself, deprived of an external goal 
or sense, turns out to be a production of a sort that does not manufac-
ture anything apart from the production of production itself. But, at 
the same time, the mechanism of repetition that propels the circulation, 
is based as much on self-presentation as on doubling — in consequence 
of which we’re faced with production multiplying itself without end, 
obsessed with itself. The unreal space of absolute otherness, which there 
is no way to describe adequately, seems to come to life, to acquire mon-
strous characteristics, consuming the unfortunate researchers. The dan-
ger stems from the fact that the protagonists do not now stand face to 
face with the unknown, but rather are caught in the trap of language 
itself. However, if the “factory” discovered by them is a form of madness, 
then this must be their own madness, or at least the madness of the 
Doctor (from this perspective, his strange smile would be a symptom 
of the madness of the protagonist himself ). “‚Have you gone mad?’ 
whispered the Engineer. On his forehead were large drops of sweat” 
(Lem 1990: 51). Except that both the whisper (not a shout) and the 
“large drops of sweat” suggest that he also suspects himself of participa-
tion in this madness.
In just this sense, the scene in the putative factory—from the story 
by Stanisław Lem—would constitute a critique of modernity; whereas 
the threat of madness would pertain precisely to the modern subject, 
who discovers that he has been dispossessed of his own language. Howe-
ver, another reading is possible, which would see the same scene trans-
formed into a prefiguration of the late-capitalist simulation of desire. 
Referring to Deleuze and Guattari, Manfred Geier suggested that the 
“factory” functions in Lem’s novel like a schizophrenic desiring machine, 
being a source not only of cognitive confusion, but also of . . . pleasure:
All of this together, necessarily maintained in the shoddy order of a master 
concept: the “factory”,  (. . .) “functions” as a game, as a process of linguistic 
production, which may be — and desires to be — read without subordination 
to the laws of an in-advance-agreed-upon and socially -determined significati-
veness (Geier 1989: 118-119, my italics).
Nevertheless, such a change of perspective would demand one thing, 
namely: the abandonment of the question of meaning and the inclusion 
of oneself into this “game,” going as far as the self-destruction of the 
subject in an ecstasy of “linguistic production.” Of course, the pleasure 
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flowing from this would demand a certain price. This time, however, 
the subject would be subject to being dispossessed not of language, but 
of matter, to being transfigured from a bodily being into a being purely 
communicative. The promise, which the textual automaton makes to 
us, has to do not only with plaisir du texte, but also — être sauvée par 
texte.
II
Not long after the year 2000, in feminist theory, there arose the need 
to oppose oneself to the textualism that had, until recently, been influ-
ential. As Katarzyna Szopa explains, “the stranglehold of postmodernist 
constructivism, ‘backfired’ after such events as terrorist attacks, catac-
lysms, the development of late capitalism, wars, the degradation of the 
environment etc.” (Szopa 2018: 99) Yet if we move beyond declarations, 
it will turn out that the shift away from textualism is not an easy matter, 
and the transition to the new materialism is founded upon a chain of 
substitutions. Szopa, the author of a monograph on Luce Irigaray, 
emphatically underlines that, already in the 1980’s, there arose, with 
regard to this issue, a certain misunderstanding—as a result of which, 
Irigaray’s pre-“new materialist” position was occasionally criticized, at 
the time, as being a hidden essentialism. On the other hand, it seems 
that feminist materialism itself, despite everything, remained in a certain 
relation with essentialism:
According to [Alison] Stone, such an understanding—of biology, essence and 
matter as self-forming substances, taking an active part in the production of 
meaning—is fundamentally an essentialist standpoint. This is because it assumes 
that matter possesses a pre-discursive or pre-cultural essence, which is active, 
causative and dynamically changing, as well as tending to the expression of its 
specificity at the level of form and cultural activity. Contemporary scholars of 
feminism described this position by the term “new materialism” (Szopa 2018: 91, 
italics mine).
Nevertheless, already in the next sentence, Szopa states unambigu-
ously: “Materialism, in  Irigaray’s work, is a perspective that is erroneously 
identified with essentialism” (Szopa 2018: 91). Thus, perhaps Alison 
Stone simply repeats the old mistake; though one could also express this 
more carefully, by assuming that all she did was recapitulate some of the 
existing accusations (Stone 2006; cf. Szopa 2018: 18). In any case, 
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Katarzyna Szopa calls, as her next witness, Naomi Schor, according to 
whom the “pre-discursive exteriority” in Irigaray’s work is not bound 
up with an absolutization of the idea of the biological body, but rather 
indicates a particular referential sphere, one that’s of concern to the 
experimental sciences. Nevertheless, the quote below shows emphatically 
that the experimental sciences function here as an instance of authority 
founded upon an immediate act of faith. We read:
And that is her [Irigaray’s — K.U.] reliance on the universe of science, notably 
physics (but also chemistry to the extent that the borders between them cannot 
always be clearly drawn) which enjoys a strange and largely unexamined privi-
lege in Irigaray’s conceptual universe (Schor 1994: 53).
So, if the scientific domain constitutes a privileged (originary) plane 
of reference for the practice of re-semanticisation, in Irigaray’s philoso-
phy, of the female body—or, specifically, of its generative parts, above 
all the “two lips” as well as the placenta—then it is clear that her  “mate-
rialist” approach could be reduced to a merely discursive operation, as 
it consists solely in an invocation of a particular “scientific” language, 
the choice of which remains arbitrary and thus beyond any rational 
justification. As a result, the very privileging of science is seen by Schor 
as a spectacle of the uncanny, because precisely the category of the 
“uncanny” is evoked by the description of it as “strange” as well as “lar-
gely unexamined”. Thus, the reference to science clarifies nothing, but 
rather to the contrary— additionally “obscures” Irigaray’s arguments.
It follows from this that the gender difference does not at all have 
a pre-established character; to the contrary—it is established precisely 
through the sense-producing process; while its alleged “irreducibility” 
constitutes, in essence, a proposal—the assumed “finished product” 
that’s presupposed by the entire operation. The joke lies in the fact that 
this “finished product” remains a regulative idea which, in the course of 
discursive practice, is invoked and mediated exclusively in a series of 
figurations following upon one another.
III
Franco Berardi’s book The Uprising operates within a rhetoric of mes-
sianism, introduced here, no doubt, under the influence of Giorgio 
Agamben. Berardi expresses praise for a poetry that is fluidly transformed 
into a “coming European insurrection” (Berardi 2012: 68). Thus, poetry, 
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uprising and insurrection constitute, here, a series of synonyms — not 
so much a passage as a series of repeated representations that reflects 
a series of advents, rapidly following upon one another. In this way, the 
predicted parousia appears as a Derridean deferral and a Barthesian 
“deferred action”, in the context of which “the infinity of the signifier 
refers not to some idea of the ineffable (the unnameable signified) but 
to that of a playing (...)” (Barthes 1977: 158).
Berardi’s project assumes that poetry enlivens equally both language 
and the body. The parallelism and convertibility of these formulations 
suggests that it is a matter of the embodiment of language, the making 
of it into a (bodily) organ or, equally, an instrument, an “extension,” 
a medium of human expression. This is possible because, as one of 
Berardi’s Polish commentators explains, “poetry assumes the presence 
of the voice, and thus also of the body indispensable in the process of 
expressing oneself ” (Kłosiński 2017a: 123). Nevertheless, the passage 
from voice to body is made here a bit too quickly, showing signs of 
wishful thinking. And if Berardi states that “poetry is a singular vibration 
of the voice. This vibration can create resonances, and resonances may 
produce common space” (Berardi 2012: 147), he, at the same time, 
redirects attention from the source of the vibration (the voice) to the 
acoustic system. Let us remember, then, that resonance results not only 
in communication, but also in the strengthening, filtering or distortion 
of the vibration. In turn, the introduction into the acoustic system of 
electronic converters opened the way to the complete disembodiment 
of the voice (“For it was voice and only voice, and there was nothing 
else beyond!”—to quote the poem Dziewczyna [Girl] by the Polish poet, 
Bolesław Leśmian, writing on the brink of the age of radio). Later we 
even discovered that writing and text are already, in their own way, an 
augmentation of the voice (“Turn on your receiver”—this time, a quote 
from the rock band Nazareth)—one which subjects the voice to mecha-
nisation, ultimately causing it to lose itself in a labyrinth of its own 
echoes and transformations.
When Michał Kłosiński employs the term “utopian alternative” to 
describe Berardi’s project, and dismisses his demands as “banal,” one 
can distinctly hear, in this dismissal, a note of disenchantment. A “uto-
pian alternative”—that is, it seems, an alternative that is unreal, apparent, 
fictional, impossible to bring into reality . . . All this is true; nevertheless, 
Berardi’s project should be treated not as a philosophical or theoretical 
statement, but—as a poetic one. Thus, the point is not that the Italian 
author has not come to grips with the problems towering above him, 
and has not presented a credible method for bringing to life the double 
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miracle of the embodiment of language and of the recovery of speech. 
In essence, what appears as “utopian” here is not so much the specific 
alternative, as the materialism itself; one might say—materialismo che 
viene (the sequence of mediations remains after all “unendingly” open). 
The one thing I’m not certain about is whether materialism, as the  object 
of eschatological desire, is truly an alternative to the capitalist “liquefac-
tion of the world”, or rather its necessary and complimentary part...
IV
Since materialism would be the utopia of our time, then all that would 
realistically remain for us is the textual game, unending and unlimited 
by anything, game as far as the eye can see. Yet, who would be the sub-
ject, the lord of this game? Already years ago, an interesting answer to 
this question was offered by Hans-Georg Gadamer. According to Gada-
mer, every game is bound up with “movement as such” (Gadamer 1989: 
103) Game as movement would, of course, be a trembling; yet, in 
contrast to Berardi’s vibration, it would not imply or point toward any 
mover, any source external to itself. This shift would assert “the primacy 
of the game over the players engaged in it” (Gadamer 1989: 106). The 
philosopher writes further: 
The attraction of a game, the fascination it exerts, consists precisely in the fact 
that the game masters the players. Even in the case of games in which one tries 
to perform tasks that one has set oneself, there is a risk that they will not “work”, 
“succeed”, or “succeed again”, which is the attraction of the game. Whoever 
“tries” is in fact the one who is tried. The real subject of the ame... is not the 
player but instead the game itself (Gadamer 1989: 106).
Cersei Lannister, a character in the series of fantasy novels by George 
R. R. Martin, grasps this problem in what is, for this particular charac-
ter, a strikingly aphoristic way: “When you play the game of thrones, 
you win or you die. There is no middle ground” (Martin 2011: 471). 
The protagonist addresses these words to Ned Stark, the (apparently) 
most formidable of her political rivals. Thanks to a well-thought out 
narrative focusing on the part of the author, the sympathy of readers of 
the first volume in the series is fixed on Ned; hence, his fall — though 
obliquely predicted by Cersei — may also be experienced by the reader 
with shock and disbelief. Only once imprisoned in the dungeon does 
Ned recognise that it has fallen to him to play the role of the fool. Indeed, 
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throughout the whole game, this particular protagonist overestimated 
his powers and influence, being in essence a figurehead, moving along 
paths laid out for him and, finally, acquiring only such knowledge as 
would prove fatal to himself. And so we may well come to the conclusion 
that the greatest mistake Ned Stark made was that he entered the titular 
game at all. This does not mean, however, that the protagonist was 
doomed to fail. On the contrary, he could have avoided the catastrophe, 
or at least postponed it, either by going over to the side of the Lannisters, 
or by accepting the proposition made to him by Renly and pre-empting 
Cersei’s actions. Ned acted otherwise, however; from the very beginning 
he engaged in the contest in such a way that his honour not suffer from 
it. In other words, he assumed and consistently maintained the attitude 
of someone who has been forced to play the game, who is not comple-
tely committed to it and participates in it only in order to gain the 
privilege of withdrawing himself from the game. Meanwhile, as Gada-
mer wrote:
Play fulfils its purpose only if the player loses himself in play. Seriousness is not 
merely something that calls us away from play; rather, seriousness in playing is 
necessary to make the play wholly play. Someone who doesn’t take the game 
seriously is a spoilsport (Gadamer 1989: 102).
Obviously, Gadamer distinguished between the simulated world of 
the game and the world of our existence, superordinate to the former. 
Yet if Cersei were right—and the “game of thrones” were to constitute 
a total game, a game without borders, in which one really “wins or 
dies”—then, in that case, our sympathetic “spoilsport” would be driven 
not by any home-sickness for a familial idyll in distant Winterfell (all 
of this would be only his own, “private,” game) but by the death drive, 
augmented by a complex connected with the older brother Brandon, 
whom Ned had to, as it were, replace in the role of lord, husband and 
father. In the simulacral space of a total game—for instance, the “game 
of thrones”—only he who “completely submits to the game” intensifies 
within himself the will of life. 
V
I reserve the term “total game” (or “game without borders”) for a contest 
that would no longer require apportioning to oneself a space distinct 
from what Gadamer calls “a world determined by the seriousness of 
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purposes” (Gadamer 1989: 102). It does not require this space, since, 
in this particular instance, the game would turn out to be congruent 
with the world. If, however—as Krzysztof M. Maj argues—it is precisely 
thanks to immersion that “the game ceases to be a ludic contest, since 
it becomes reality” (Maj 2015: 377), then the case of the total game would 
demand—no more and no less—ideal immersion. Of course, in the real 
world such an ideal immersion does not occur. Maj recognises this, and 
so he speaks of a reduction of distance between the “world-recipient” 
(the reader, watcher, player) and the world of the story (storyworld), 
rather than a total dissolution of this distance. Thus, irrespective of the 
extent of the reduction, and irrespective of how much the initial value 
of the distance might decrease, we can safely assume that even in a far-
-reaching immersion, this value would, nevertheless, always remain 
positive, never quite reaching zero. 
Maj presents immersion as “a new poetics of reception” (Maj 2015: 
368) or, at least, a “style of reception” (Maj 2015: 389). But, though 
the status of this phenomenon seems to be strictly related to the rising 
role of new electronic media as vehicles of culture, it does not seem that 
immersion would constitute an essentially new, and formerly unknown, 
manner of seeing. In the dissertation The Text as World and Game, Kata-
rzyna Prejzner was inclined to accept “immersion” (in Polish, this term 
was written here with a double “m”) as a sort of “perspective on textuality, 
within which it is possible to interpret the text as a world” (Prejzner 
2009: 39). The traces of an immersive mode of reception would be all 
the social rituals, games and forms of play that extend our experience 
of being in the fictional or virtual world we are entering always from 
the outside. Thus, immersion must be distinguished from all Romantic 
and Modernist efforts to transfer literature into, or repeat it in, “the real 
world.” It is based on a movement leading in a completely opposite 
direction. Thus, we do not assume the role of a literary protagonist, who 
appears in the “real” world; on the contrary, we are arrivals “from here” 
who undertake the labour of exploring “another world.” For this reason, 
the patron saints of immersion cannot be Don Quixote, Gustav or Lady 
Bovary. This role could, however, be filled by Dante Alighieri, Alice or 
perhaps captain John Carter, the hero of E. R. Burroughs’ A Princess of 
Mars . . .
The problem of distance, raised by Krzysztof M. Maj, is crucial 
equally in this regard that it draws attention to the ambiguous relation 
that arises between immersion and interpretation. For the dependence 
between these two categories displays itself in a relation of inverse pro-
portion: the fuller the immersion, the narrower the interpretative hori-
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zon. And though Katarzyna Prejzner mentions the “interpretation of 
the text as a world,” it seems that it is a matter here rather of the very 
experience of the text as a world, but at the cost of a simultaneous 
overlooking of its textuality, which both authors, Prejzner and Maj, 
underline, independently of one another.
Michał Kłosiński approaches the matter differently. Outlining his 
project of a hermeneutics of video games (Kłosiński 2018), this scholar 
reaches for the concept of “emmersion,” proposed by Piotr Kubiński. 
What is essential, the distancing and alienating emmersive factor would 
be, or at least could be, introduced intentionally, in order to upset the 
illusion of access to the world of the story, and in order to demonstrate 
its poetic organisation (Kubiński 2014; 2016). In consequence, it is 
precisely thanks to emmersion that a video game would fulfil the demands 
laid down by Gadamer for the work of art, which is a particular type of 
game insofar as it is intentionally open to being supplemented on the 
part of the recipient:
All presentation is potentially a representation for someone. That this possibility 
is intended is the characteristic feature of art as play. The closed world of play 
lets down one of its walls, as it were. A religious rite and a play in a theatre 
obviously do not represent in the same sense as a child playing. Their being is 
not exhausted by the fact that they present themselves, for at the same time they 
point beyond themselves to the audience which participates by watching. Play 
here is no longer the mere self-presentation of an ordered movement, nor mere 
representation in which the child playing is totally absorbed, but it is ‘represen-
ting for someone.’ The directedness proper to all representation comes to the 
fore here and is constitutive of the being of art (Gadamer 1989: 108). 
If Piotr Kubiński outlined the dynamic of immersion and emmersion, 
then Michał Kłosiński did something different—the relation of depen-
dence between both “forces” was grasped by him as a dialectical play, 
which requires an observer. This is an essential thing from a hermeneu-
tical point of view,2 since it makes possible the transition (or, to phrase 
it more carefully—the transitioning) from the game to the form of art. 
There remains, however, another issue: namely, that art itself is under-
stood here rather traditionally, as a work or a product. From such a per-
spective, a hermeneutics of video games, based on the dialectic between 
2 The methodological context for the project of a “hermeneutics of video 
games,” sketched in the work of Michał Kłosiński, are the conceptions of Hans-
-Georg Gadamer, and especially of Paul Ricoeur. This author does not refer to 
a “radical hermeneutics,” under the sign of Gianni Vattimo or John D. Caputo.
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immersion and emmersion, would be a movement anti-Barthesian “in 
spirit”; it would be a shift from text to work. 
Postscript
In an article from 2015, Maj made use of the formulation: to “imagi-
natively (emotionally, viscerally) inhabit a world [of a story — K. U.]” 
(Maj 2015: 381), borrowed from David Harman, inventor of the term 
storyworld, in the Routledge Encyclopedia of Narrative Theory (Herman, 
Jahn & Ryan 2008). Recently, in Maj’s doctoral dissertation (Maj 2018), 
the metaphor of “inhabiting” was replaced by “dwelling” or even 
“coming-to-dwell”! What is essential is that, at the end of his dissertation, 
Krzysztof M. Maj made reference — following Michał Kłosiński’s article 
“Making a dwelling of virtual worlds” (Kłosiński 2017b) — to “the 
experience of worldliness in Heidegger” (Maj 2018: 282). Nevertheless, 
still more important seems to be the grammatical change, as a result of 
which “dwelling in the world” was replaced by “making a dwelling of 
the world”. This is because “making a dwelling of ” gained, thereby, 
a relational character, while the world ceased to function independently 
of its “dwellers”; it no longer looked like a vacant building (ready to be 
occupied), but became a world because, and only because, someone 
made a dwelling of it. Further, the process described ceased to be a pure 
work of imagination, gaining, by contrast, an existential-ontic dimension. 
Yet all of this came at the cost of silence, on the part of the author of 
this dissertation, with regard to the issue that—in the fragment of Buil-
ding, Dwelling, Thinking cited by him—Martin Heidegger recalls the 
“old bridge in Heidelberg,” but not the bridge leading to, say, the Hun-
dred Acre Wood. Let us listen to the philosopher: 
If all of us now think, from where we are right here, of the old bridge in Heidel-
berg, this thinking toward that location is not a mere experience inside the 
persons present here; rather, it belongs to the nature of our thinking of that 
bridge that in itself thinking gets through, persists through, the distance to that 
location. From this spot right here, we are there at the bridge – we are by no 
means at some representational content in our consciousness (Heidegger 2001: 
154).
Heidegger had in mind a place that had earlier revealed itself direc-
tly within the horizon of our experience, and was not “replanted” there 
from the world of the story. Nevertheless, according to Maj, this diffe-
rence is completely negligible: “Instead of the metaphysical truth about 
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reality what appears is the truth about world-feeling, about being in the 
world and about dwelling; this latter truth transgresses beyond the arti-
ficial limits [demarcations? — K. U.] between factual reality and one 
that is fictional, fantastic or virtual—an opposition legitimated by the 
modernist inheritance of metaphysical imperrealism” (Maj 2018: 282). 
However, there is no certainty that the problem may be reduced to 
“imperrealistic” prejudices. A story does not necessarily demand that 
we equate it with “factual reality.” Its purpose is rather to make us re-
-think our reality from a perspective provided to us by “world-feeling,” 
which is akin to the experience of “being transported” (in the words of 
Richard J. Gerrig) into the world of the narrative. Let us recall the title 
of Tolkien’s story: The Hobbit, or There and Back Again! It is not a mat-
ter, then, of “making a dwelling in virtual worlds”. It is a matter of 
returning from “long journeys”—while letting them alter our very selves. 
We remember, of course, that for Martin Heidegger a place is an 
open structure: “We do not dwell because we have built, but we build 
and have built because we dwell, that is, because we are dwellers” (Heideg-
ger 2001: 146). True, to dwell means among other things to rest; at least, 
in the view of the Heidelberg philosopher, place and path do not stand 
in any sort of an opposition, since the latter constitutes an extension of 
the former. Thus, it is no accident that the construction provided as an 
illustration is a bridge: “The bridge gathers to itself in its own way earth 
and sky, divinities and mortals” (Heidegger 2001: 151). This is impor-
tant, because a bridge does not here indicate passage alone; it is also the 
sort of place where we gather, a way-station. For this reason, Maj next 
references the oikology of Tadeusz Sławek and his co-authors (Sławek 
et al. 2013), which describes a house as an open place, a point of depar-
ture, “from which we can depart to the world and to which we can 
return from that world.”3 Thus, a house is not opposed to the world; on 
the contrary—it constitutes a portal or also a gateway; while a journey 
into the world allows us to look at a house from a different perspective. 
The lesson that’s being told here is that the positions of “the house” or 
“the world” are transitional; while figures from a fictional or virtual 
world can receive us “at their place” or “at home.” And this, according 
to Maj, is precisely the moral of an animated parabasis uploaded to 
YouTube, a sort of an addendum to the series of games about the witcher, 
Geralt. At a certain point in this film, during a feast with friends, the 
central figure of this fictional universe turns to face the viewer directly. 
Maj writes: 
3 K. M. Maj, op. cit., p. 288.
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The longing of the player for the world of the game, finds its mirror reflection 
in the longing of the figures making a dwelling in that world—a longing, 
however, not so much for the player, as for a co-inhabitant, a companion during 
a long journey. [ . . . ] World-feeling is not, then, only an act of concretisation; 
it is not only a manifestation of a culture of participation and it is not only 
a product of a xeno-encyclopedic competence.  It is, above all, a manifestation 
of a readiness to make a home out of a fictional habitat, to which one will return 
and which one will miss (Maj 2018: 299). 
Yet, it seems that the series of breakups and returns constitutes 
a somewhat too sentimental interpretation of the existential allegories 
offered by Heidegger and Sławek. In his essay “Making a Dwelling in 
Virtual Worlds,” Michał Kłosiński strived, in contrast, to remain faith-
ful to the Heideggerian category of care (of course, this is so only to the 
extent that we agree that all care with regard to virtual worlds is some-
thing more than a game, more than just a pretence of care). Meanwhile, 
let us note that “making a dwelling” suggests the somewhat provisional, 
casual, transient character of this activity. Since, to the extent that we 
live always in some specific, distinguished place, at a specific address 
(even if this place remains—as  Heidegger would say —in motion, and 
the address itself has a processual character), to that extent we can make 
a dwelling here and there: now here, now there, a little here and a little 
there . . . But, also from an oikological perspective, one should not 
necessarily tend towards a situation in which the “fictional habitat” 
becomes, for us, a symbolic home. Since, if it were this for anyone, it 
would be a “home” exclusively for the fictional characters, whereas we 
ourselves only make a dwelling of it, for a certain time, or from time to 
time. 
It is also worth remembering that the animated parabasis to the series 
of computer games about Geralt, mentioned by Maj, is not the first 
supplement (or expansion?) to the “Witcher” universe. Let us recall that, 
in 1992, Andrzej Sapkowski wrote the story “Something Ends, Some-
thing Begins,” which did not belong—but nevertheless referred—to the 
main series of the Witcher novels, and described the wedding of the 
witcher Geralt and the sorceress Yennefer. The story, published at first 
in the fanzine Czerwony Karzeł (Red Dwarf ), became, some years later, 
the title work in a book gathering scattered texts by the author, a deci-
ded majority of which had nothing to do with the Witcher “saga”.
This work by Sapkowski cannot, of course, be treated as an epitha-
lamium, and yet it was written—as the author informs us in the intro-
duction—as a wedding present, a present for a couple, moreover one 
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with a strong connection to the Polish fantasy fandom. True, in the story 
itself we do not find any devices that would intentionally disturb the 
illusion of autonomy of the fictional world; yet, it is necessary to note 
that the story’s plot is focused not so much on the protagonists’ wedding, 
as on the wedding guests, whose arrival may have been a certain surprise 
for Geralt and Yennefer; since “the list of guests—which was not very 
long—was composed by the engaged couple, while the inviting itself 
was to be done by Jaskier. It soon became apparent that the troubadour 
had lost the list, and this even before he had managed to read it. Asha-
med, he did not admit to this and chose the easy way out—he invited 
anyone he could” (Sapkowski 2001: 173). Of course, the majority of 
the wedding guests are characters from the Witcher series, Geralt’s com-
panions; but there are also minor figures, with a history of only episodic 
appearances. The last to arrive at the Rozrog castle is the belated wed-
ding-guest, the highwayman Vissing, known as Pow-Wow. “Geralt and 
Yennefer had already known Pow-Wow for a long time. Neither of them, 
however, had thought of inviting him. This was evidently Jaskier’s job” 
(Sapkowski 2001: 199) Can we assume that Pow-Wow —absent from 
the pages of the novels—is a figure, an avatar, a symbolic and at the 
same time comic representation of the readers looking into the world 
invented by Sapkowski? Indeed, the author fulfilled the expectations of 
fans counting on a happy ending to the protagonists’ wanderings. One 
way or another, Vissing was received by the newlyweds with full courtesy:
“Greetings, Vissing,” said the sorceress with a smile. “It is nice that you 
remembered about us. Make yourself at home.” 
The highwayman bowed genteelly (...).
“Many years of joy and a pile of kids,” he announced thunderously, “This 
is what I wish you, my dears. A hundred years of good fortune, what am I say-
ing, two-hundred, for fuck’s sake, two hundred. Ah, how happy I am, Geralt, 
and you, lady Yennefer. I always believed that you would get married; although 
you always argued and snapped at each other like these, if you will permit me 
to say, dogs. Ah, for fuck’s sake, what am I saying . . . 
“Greetings, Vissing, greetings,” said the Witcher, pouring wine into the 
largest goblet standing nearby. “Drink to our health. Whence do you come? 
There was a rumour spread about that you were sitting in a dungeon.” 
“I got out,” Pow-Wow drank in one gulp and sighed deeply. “I got out, after 
paying that, how do you say it . . . Fuck! . . . bail (Sapkowski 2001: 199).
The character’s vulgar language is the smallest problem, though it 
does betray that Vissing, arriving at the wedding feast, has found him-
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self completely out of his element. Though he tries very hard, he is 
unable to behave appropriately. Yet, what is most important is the fact 
that Vissing has arrived uninvited and that, in general, he should not 
be here. He should remain beyond the stage of the fictional world, he 
should be “sitting in a dungeon”, from which he got out after paying 
that, well . . . bail. This interference of discourses, typical for Sapkowski, 
serves not only a comical effect, but also indicates the heteronomic 
nature of the world he created, which reveals itself as a patchwork, sewn 
together from various elements (one might say: each one from a different 
story). For this reason, there is no way to agree, without reservations, 
with the idea that we “make a dwelling in virtual worlds.” One should, 
rather, speak about the fact that we only stay in them as guests, remem-
bering at the same time the ambivalent meaning of the figure of the 
guest.
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